Manoj Joshi, The Alternating Fortunes of India-China Dialogue Post-Galwan, Observer Research Foundation, June 2026.
India’s strategy of managing its relationship with China diplomatically in the wake of the 2020 crisis achieved a breakthrough when, on 21 October 2024, the two countries announced a joint patrolling arrangement that would lead to disengagement of forces at the Depsang Bulge and the Charding-Ninglung Nala junction near Demchok.[1] These were the last two of the six areas on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had blockaded Indian positions in 2020, leading to a deadly conflict at Galwan that claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers.[a] The other four contested areas had already been resolved by creating “no patrol” zones through joint agreements, while these two remained deadlocked since mid-2022.
India had responded to the 2020 Chinese blockades and troop deployments with an equivalent mobilisation of its own. However, instead of pursuing a military option, it leveraged economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts to persuade Beijing to undo its actions in eastern Ladakh. Through both posture and policy, India made it clear that bilateral relations would not return to normal until the situation on the border was resolved. After four years of negotiations, China finally agreed to lift the blockade in the last two areas, setting the stage for a de-escalation of forces on both sides of the LAC and a restoration of normalcy to Sino-Indian ties.
Xi Jinping became president of China in 2013, and Narendra Modi became prime minister of India a year later. Both appear to have expected to maintain good relations with the other. However, China sought to structure the relationship in a way that preserved its dominance on the border, as evident from the signalling during Xi’s first visit to India in October 2014, which coincided with a Chinese push into the Indian side of the LAC in Demchok and Chumar.[2]
PM Modi raised the Chinese actions directly with President Xi, as noted at their joint press conference.[3] During Modi’s visit to China in 2015, he once again pressed China to clarify the points along the LAC where differences existed—as enshrined in the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993 and the subsequent Agreement on the Military Confidence Building Measures of 1996. Modi was pointed on the issue, noting, “A shadow of uncertainty always hangs over the sensitive areas of the border region … neither side knows where the Line of Actual Control is in these areas.”[4] He added that he had proposed the process of clarifying it.
However, China did not express interest in establishing a well-defined LAC, likely since the lack of clarity allowed it to periodically generate tensions with India. Three weeks after Modi’s 2015 visit, a junior Chinese official told a group of visiting academics that the clarification process would complicate the problem but refrained from explaining how.[5]
When Modi and Xi met at the 17th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit on 9 June at Astana, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar described the thrust of the meeting thus: “[A]t the time of global uncertainty, India-China relations are a factor of stability and as the world becomes more multipolar it was important for India and China to work together more closely.” Further, he used a phrase that has been heard often since, that the two countries had an understanding that their “differences should not become disputes” and indeed, if they were handled well they “could even be opportunities.”[6]
A week later, with little or no warning, tensions boiled over Doklam. Indian forces stationed at Doka La (or Doka pass) moved down to block the construction of a Chinese road moving towards the Zompelri (or Jampheri) ridge. Since the territory is disputed between only Bhutan and China, Beijing had not anticipated Indian intervention. On India’s part, the action was motivated by the concern that Chinese control of the Zompelri ridge would provide China a commanding view over the strategic Siliguri corridor.[7]
After a month of high rhetoric and mutual recriminations, PM Modi and President Xi met at the sidelines of a G20 meeting in Hamburg on 7 July 2017, engaging in tough negotiations to begin a de-escalation process. Subsequently, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who is also Special Representative on China issues, met his counterpart Yang Jichei in Beijing on 27-28 July, and after another month of public rhetoric and negotiations, a disengagement was announced.
The timing of the truce was important, with Beijing hosting the BRICS Summit in Xiamen in September and Modi expected to attend. Further, in October, the Communist Party of China was set to host its five-yearly congress—the most significant political event in China—and any action against India that backfired would have reflected negatively on Xi at a critical moment.
Consequently, after the Doklam crisis, when PM Modi attended the Xiamen BRICS Summit in early September 2017, China went out of its way to accommodate Indian positions. It also named Pakistan-based terrorist groups for the first time, in a joint declaration—the Xiamen Declaration. Furthermore, it dropped its opposition to another longstanding Indian demand: support for India’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The improvement in the bilateral atmosphere following Doklam was soon reflected in diplomatic activity. The 20th round of talks between the Special Representatives of India and China was held in New Delhi in December 2017 after a gap of nearly 20 months. In February 2018, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale visited Beijing.
The longer-term outcome of the Doklam episode was a decision by India and China to institute a system of informal annual summits where leaders from the two countries could interact with each other without being restricted to a fixed agenda. The first summit was confirmed by Modi and Xi on 20 March, when the former called Xi to congratulate him on his re-election as president following the 2018 National People’s Congress. In mid-April, National Security Advisor Doval visited China and met Yang Jichei (now Secretary of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission) as well as the new Chinese Special Representative Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
On 20 April, after talks with visiting Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that the first summit would take place in Wuhan on 27-28 April. An Indian press release afterwards noted that the meeting “will be a positive factor for stability amidst current global uncertainties”, adding that it would be “conducive for the development and prosperity of the region and will create the conditions for an Asian Century.” The first of these summits was held on 27-28 April 2018. While billed as informal, it was a carefully prepared event and called for officials on both sides to enhance strategic communications—in effect, a mandate for greater ministerial and official-level engagement.
Sino-Indian ties appeared to be soaring after the low point of the previous year.[8] As Professor B.R. Deepak noted in an analysis published in 2020, the establishment of the first-ever official high-level mechanism to promote people-to-people and cultural exchanges was a clear signal of the changed mood.[9] When PM Modi addressed the Shangri-La Dialogue for the first time on 1 June 2018, he outlined India’s views on the Indo-Pacific as being a “geographic area”, rather than a geopolitical construct, making it clear that the Quad was not a “club of limited members” or directed against any country.[10]
In the months that followed, India-China relations stabilised rapidly, and the two sides resumed high-level military exchanges and people-to-people interactions. In August, they mooted a new MoU to boost defence exchanges to update the older one from 2006. The two sides also signed an internal security agreement to focus on terrorism, narcotics and human trafficking, intelligence sharing, and disaster management.
By 2019, the election year in India, signs of Chinese recalibration were evident. The Chinese government adopted a neutral stance on the issue of India’s Balakot strike on Pakistan, following the Pulwama terrorist attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy. Having blocked the designation of Masood Azhar in the UN’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee in April, China withdrew its veto in May. The shift reflected Beijing’s interest in preserving long-term bilateral stability and engaging with the likelihood of a returning Modi government. With tensions with the US mounting, keeping India from moving closer to Washington became a strategic priority for China. Additionally, India was on China’s radar as an important market and a destination for future investment.
Within a month of his re-election, PM Modi met President Xi at Bishkek on 13 June at the sidelines of the 19th summit of the SCO, with both sides signalling a commitment to maintain the momentum of Sino-Indian ties established during the Wuhan meeting. Weeks later, the two met again in Osaka on 28 June, a meeting that became a trilateral with the addition of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The followup to the Wuhan summit was held at Mahabalipuram, a suburb of Chennai on 10-11 October. Two complications arose. First, China expressed displeasure at India’s decision to bifurcate the erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir into two Union Territories. Specifically, the Chinese government objected to the reading down of Article 370 and the creation of the Ladakh Union Territory, part of which is claimed and occupied by China. Second, it highlighted the clash between Indian and Chinese patrols in the Pangong Tso region in September, a month before the summit. However, this was managed through existing Sino-Indian mechanisms.
While these issues made evident significant differences between the two sides, the countries nonetheless reiterated their “consensus” from Wuhan: “India and China are factors for stability in the current international landscape and that both sides will manage their differences and not allow differences on any issue to become disputes.” The two sides agreed to set up a new mechanism for trade, which was growing but heavily tilted against India. President Xi raised the issue of enhancing the contacts on the defence and security side and stepping up military-to-military engagement. In the discussions among officials, there was talk of an “early harvest” in boundary negotiations.[11]
Since the 2000s, Chinese intrusions across the LAC had been increasing, resulting in minor crises in 2008, 2013, and 2014. In 2020, however, China adopted a more serious variant. Even as COVID-19 swept through the world, the PLA blockaded six points on the LAC in eastern Ladakh, where Indian and Chinese claims overlapped and, by agreement and established practice, both sides patrolled to the extent of their respective claims. Simultaneously, the PLA massed some 30,000 troops in the area, ignoring the terms of the 1996 Agreement on Military Confidence Building measures, which required prior notification of troop movements near the border.
India was caught off guard but responded through a measured policy, which involved confronting the Chinese forces at the blockade points and reinforcing the strength of the Indian Army to match the Chinese build up. The Indian message was that India would not escalate, neither would it back off, but it was prepared to use diplomacy to restore the status quo ante.
Formal dialogue between the two countries came to a halt. There would be no meetings at the apex level for the next four years after the Chennai summit in 2019, until the 2024 bilateral meeting between PM Modi and President Xi on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Kazan, Russia. At working levels, however, communications continued, though the focus of the meetings from the Indian point of view remained on achieving status quo ante. At the political level, the principal interlocutors for India were External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and NSA Doval. At the military level, talks were held between Indian and Chinese corps commanders, alternately at Chushul and Moldo in the Pangong Tso/Spanggur Tso region.
On 6 June, a meeting took place between the top military commanders at Moldo on the Spanggur Tso, calling for disengagement and de-escalation. While no joint statement was issued, the Ministry of External Affairs declared the next day that the talks had taken place in a “cordial and positive atmosphere” and that the two sides would continue their dialogue and engagement, to “restore peace and tranquillity in the border areas.” However, on 15 June, in the process of working out a pullback, the situation in Galwan spiralled out of control, leading to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA personnel. The clash deepened Sino-Indian crisis and set in motion a chain of discussions and negotiations whose consequences would persist for years.
The Indian position in response to this standoff was articulated clearly from the outset. Jaishankar conveyed it to his counterpart Wang Yi first through a video conference in June 2020 and then at an in-person meeting in Moscow on 10 September 2020, calling on China to restore the status quo in Ladakh as it had existed prior to 20 April. He pointed to the bilateral agreements between the two countries on maintaining peace on the LAC and noted that the PLA actions were contrary to the understandings reached by foreign ministers and special representatives.[12] A similar message was delivered by NSA Doval, serving as India’s special representative for the highest-level Sino-Indian dialogue. Following a two-hour telephonic conversation between Doval and his special representative counterpart Wang Yi on 5 July, the two sides agreed to pull back 1.5 km each at the Galwan clash point and leave the area as a “no patrol zone”.[13] When Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his counterpart Wei Fenghe in Moscow on 4 September 2020, he reiterated the importance of resolving the situation through dialogue.[14]
In March 2022, Wang Yi made an unannounced visit to New Delhi, his first since the border crisis, and met Jaishankar and Doval. While India agreed to discuss a range of issues from trade to the developments in Ukraine, Jaishankar clarified once again that there could be no normalcy in the India-China ties until the troops gathered on the border were withdrawn.[15] Wang put forward what China described as a three-point framework: first, the two countries needed a long-term vision; second, both must treat development cooperation as an opportunity; and third, the two sides must cooperate on multilateral issues. On the second point, he stressed the need for reviving the idea of joint projects in South Asia, an idea mooted in the Wuhan summit. He further highlighted that China was not seeking a unipolar Asia and respected “India’s traditional role in the region”. He invited Doval to visit China for the next round of the Special Representatives meeting, but Doval would only do so after immediate issues were “resolved successfully.”[16] At the BRICS NSA meeting in Johannesburg on 26 July 2023, Doval reiterated his position, telling Wang that the 2020 developments had “eroded strategic trust and the public and political basis of the relationship” between India and China.[17]
At the institutional level, the two sides continued to engage through two mechanisms: intense military-to-military talks held at the Corps Commander level at the Chushul-Moldo meeting point; and the meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), the highest level at which the foreign ministry officials meet. The WMCC held its 15th meeting virtually in the wake of the Galwan clash on 24 June, committing to implement the understanding reached by senior commanders on 6 June, namely, disengagement and de-escalation, as agreed by the foreign ministers.[18]
India’s approach to restoring status quo was sequential: first, disengagement of the forces involved in the face-to-face confrontation at the blockade points; second, de-escalation by drawing down the large military build-up on either side of the LAC; third, resuming patrolling in the areas that had been blockaded. China, however, held that India was needlessly inflating the situation and that border matters should be separated from the broader relationship. China appeared content to let the impasse persist. Five further rounds of Corps Commander talks and WMCC meetings produced no outcome. The decisive shift occurred after Indian forces took a limited but important countermove: on the night of 29-31 August 2020, they occupied certain key heights on the Kailash range that overlooked Chinese military positions in the Spanggur Tso area, along with some heights on the south bank of the adjoining Pangong Tso. At this point, China chose to return to the negotiating table instead of escalating further.[19]
The process was long and tedious. Despite several meetings between ministers, special representatives, the WMCC, and military commanders, the next disengagement occurred only in February 2021 at Pangong Tso, with the Indian forces on the Kailash range standing down as well. Both sides withdrew their forces to designated points, and the intervening area was designated as a “no patrol zone”.
The twelfth round of military-level talks in July 2021 secured a partial disengagement at Patrol Point 17A, or Gogra Post, but subsequent rounds made clear that China was resistant to further movement. It was only in September 2022 that the two sides finally agreed to disengage at Patrol Point 15 in the Kugrang River Valley, also known as Gogra-Hot Springs. Both areas were subject to “no patrol zones” to prevent face-offs.
The two remaining areas were now the Depsang Bulge, the largest area under blockade, and the sensitive Charding-Ninlung Nala in Demchok. At the 18th round of Corps Commander talks in April 2023, China demanded a 15-20-km “no patrolling” zone in the Depsang area as a precondition for disengagement—a demand that would place most of the Depsang Bulge outside Indian patrolling limits, largely within Indian-claimed territory. As India was prepared to accept a 3-4-km zone at best,[20] the negotiations stalled. The 20th round of Corps Commander talks in October 2023 and the 21st round at the Chushul-Moldo Border Meeting Point in February 2024 both ended without agreement on the two remaining areas. A statement from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs noted that both sides had “shared their perspectives” on following through with disengagement in the remaining areas.[21]
At the WMCC level, the 27th meeting in Beijing on 31 May 2023, the 28th on 30 November 2023, and the 29th on 27 March 2024 also yielded little. A shift first became visible at the 30th meeting on 31 July 2024, when a delegation led by Gourangal Das, Joint Secretary of the East Asia Division, travelled to Beijing for the talks. The shift was the result of two back-to-back meetings held by Jaishankar and Wang Yi, the first in Astana on 4 July 2024, on the sidelines of the SCO Heads of State summit, and the second some weeks later on 25 July in Vientiane during the ASEAN-related meetings. However, India did not alter its position on the issue of disengagement, and no concrete progress was announced. The substance of both meetings from the Indian perspective was the imperative of redoubling efforts to achieve “complete disengagement” and “stabilize and rebuild bilateral relations”.[22]
China, in contrast, downplayed the border issue and called for the broader "stable and sustainable" development of China–India relations.[23] A Chinese press release quoted Jaishankar as acknowledging “broad converging interests” while noting the need to “face the shadow brought by the situation in the border areas”. It also highlighted that India was ready “to take a historic, strategic, and open perspective to find solutions to the differences.”[24]
Building on these leadership-level exchanges, both sides held back-to-back WMCC meetings in July and August. Following the 31st meeting at the end of August in Beijing, an India statement described it as a “frank, constructive and forward looking exchange of views” that would help “narrow down the differences” and find “an early resolution” of the outstanding issues. Nonetheless, India reiterated that respect for the LAC was “essential for restoration of normalcy in bilateral relations.”[25] Speaking in Geneva on 12 September 2024, Jaishankar said: “We have made some progress. I would say roughly you can say about 75 per cent of the disengagement problems are sorted out.” He added that there were still things that needed to be done, especially since both sides had brought up forces close to the border.[26] On the same day, Wang Yi met Ajit Doval on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting in St Petersburg. The Chinese spokesperson highlighted the progress made in border consultations and disengagement achieved in four areas, while the Indian spokesperson underscored the need to find “as early solution to the remaining issues.”[27]
The agreement on Depsang and Demchok finally reached in October 2024 went beyond the earlier disengagement arrangements at the four other LAC points. It entailed not only disengagement but also a restoration of Indian patrolling rights. As part of the agreement, India permitted the PLA to also patrol to the extent of its claims in the eastern sector, notably Yangtse, where there had been a clash in December 2022. A further innovation was that Indian and Chinese patrols in the restored areas would henceforth be coordinated to avoid face-offs.[28]
The disengagement agreement paved the way for the first formal bilateral meeting on 23 October 2024 between PM Modi and President Xi in Kazan on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS annual summit. An Indian press release after the meeting noted that two sides stressed “the importance of properly handling differences and disputes and not allowing them to disturb peace and tranquillity” and underscored the need to view relations from a “strategic and long-term perspective” and “enhance strategic communication”—implying greater ministerial and official contact. The two leaders also directed their Special Representatives to meet soon.[29] The task of preparing for that meeting fell to the WMCC, which convened on 5 December in New Delhi. At this 32nd meeting held on 5 December in New Delhi, both sides affirmed the recent disengagement agreement, which they said had “completed the resolution of the issues that emerged in 2020.” Further, they “reflected on the lessons learnt” from those events to “prevent their recurrence.”[30]
The 23rd round of Special Representatives' talks took place in Beijing on 18 December. A press release noted that the two sides had reiterated the importance of a border settlement and “resolved to inject more vitality into the process”. Drawing on the learnings from the events of 2020, they discussed ways of maintaining peace and tranquillity and advancing “effective border management.”[31] A Chinese account of the meeting recorded a six-point consensus, including implementing the agreement and handling border appropriately “to ensure they do affect the development of bilateral ties”; speeding up border negotiations and refine rules for management; enhancing cross-border communications by resuming the Kailash-Mansarovar pilgrimage and cross-border trade; and strengthening the special representative mechanism and getting the WMCC to ensure “follow up implementation.”[32]
An important signal for the return of normalcy came when Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri travelled to China for talks with his counterpart Sun Weidong on 26 January 2025. The extent of the improvement in the military relationship was reflected in remarks by Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Wu Qian in late February, who told a Beijing briefing that the two militaries were implementing the resolutions to end the standoff in Ladakh in a “comprehensive and effective manner.” He noted that China was ready to work with India “to jointly preserve peace and tranquillity in the border areas.”[33]
On 17 March, in a wide-ranging podcast, PM Modi reflected similar sentiments, stating that while differences were natural between neighbours, it was important that these did not escalate into disputes, adding “dialogue is the key to building a stable and cooperative relationship that benefits both countries.” He referred to his meeting with President XI in Kazan and highlighted efforts to restore conditions to pre-2020 levels.[34] Chinese spokesman Mao Ning, expressing his government’s appreciation for PM Modi’s remarks, said, “A cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant is the only right choice for China and India.”[35]
Modi’s August 2025 visit to China for the SCO summit in Tianjin marked the close of one eventful phase in the India–China relationship. Before the visit, External Affairs Minister Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had visited China in July, with the former delivering a message on the importance of border peace for good relations between the two countries; the latter told his counterpart Adm. Dong Jun that it might be worth considering “a permanent solution of border demarcation by rejuvenating the established mechanism on the issue.”
At the time, the Chinese spokesman pointed to the special representative mechanism and the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Border Question as the frameworks already working towards that end, adding that “the boundary question is complicated, and it takes time to settle it.”[36] However, on the eve of the summit in Tianjin, when Wang Yi visited Delhi in mid-August for the 24th round of the special representatives’ meeting, it was decided to take up Rajnath Singh’s suggestion and revitalise the process, which could now explore an “early harvest” agreement, presumably covering the Sino-Indian border in Sikkim where differences were limited. The two sides agreed to establish a WMCC working group to “advance effective border management” and enhance the military-to-military interaction at the high level.[37] During the summit, India and China reiterated their relation as “development partners, not rivals” and welcomed the disengagement process set in motion the previous year. The leaders commended the work of the special representatives and reaffirmed their commitment to “a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary question.”
Some scope for caution remains, however, as China continues to insist that the border issue must be seen as separate from the overall bilateral relations—an echo of the earlier Chinese position that India has categorically and consistently rejected.[38]
From 2020 to 2024, India and China had little substantive political dialogue between them. Talks at the official level focused largely on resolving the standoff that arose in 2020. However, sustained dialogue and India’s firm insistence that the border situation be restored to status quo ante led to their first formal bilateral summit in five years on 23 October 2024, on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia.
India displayed strategic patience in dealing with China—strengthening its military positions while also making clear that it was willing to use military steps to strengthen its hand, as evidenced during the Kailash range operation. At the same time, its commitment to repeated rounds of military and WMCC talks reflected a genuine interest in restoring the bilateral relationship rather than prolonging the impasse.
In retrospect, the deliberate decision not to hold apex-level meetings between PM Modi and President Xi served an important signalling function. It underscored the seriousness of India’s position and its steadfastness in insisting that status quo ante was the minimum condition for normalisation of the Sino-Indian discourse.
An assessment of the situation was provided by the new ambassador of China to India, Xu Feihong, who noted at the end of February in an address at an event in New Delhi that India-China ties were entering the “phase of recovery”.[39] He described the relationship between the two nations as “one of the most important” bilateral engagements globally and noted that the talks in Beijing between the special representatives and the foreign secretary officials indicated that the countries had reached “a series of common understandings on the boundary question an practical cooperation.”
Looking ahead, resolving the boundary question in a timely and equitable manner must remain a priority for both countries. However, given the complicated history of the issue, this may prove difficult without adequate political will at the apex level on both sides. In the interim, the two militaries must develop a new set of confidence-building measures to address the gaps in the existing frameworks of cooperation that failed to prevent the 2020 crisis. Ultimately, it is critical to understand that agreements matter little without the political commitment to implement them.
Manoj Joshi is Distinguished Fellow, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] Eight months after the event, China acknowledged that four of its personnel had also been killed – the first time since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war that it had suffered and publicly acknowledged battle fatalities.
[1] Ajay Banerjee, “India, China to Resume Patrols at 2 Friction Points by Oct End,” The Tribune, October 26, 2024, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/india-china-to-resume-patrols-at-2-friction-points-by-oct-end/.
[2] “Live: As Modi Raises Border Issue, Xi Agrees with a Chinese Yes,” India Today, September 19, 2014, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/chinese-president-xi-jinping-india-narendra-modi-293124-2014-09-18.
[3] “After Modi’s Hard Talk with Xi in Delhi, Chinese Troops Pull Back in Chumar,” India Today, September 18, 2014, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/chumar-xi-jinping-ladakh-narendra-modi-pla-293166-2014-09-18.
[4] Media Centre, “Address by Prime Minister at the Tsinghua University Beijing (May 15, 2015),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25242.
[5] Manoj Joshi, Understanding the India-China Border: The enduring threat of war in high Himalaya (London: C Hurst, 2022), pp. 176.
[6] Manash Pratim Bhyuan, “Modi Meets Xi, Calls for Respecting Each Others Core Concerns,” India Today, June 9, 2017, https://www.indiatoday.in/pti-feed/story/modi-meets-xi-calls-for-respecting-each-others-core-concerns-941269-2017-06-09.
[7] Manoj Joshi, “Doklam: To Start at the Very Beginning,” ORF Special Report No. 40, Observer Research Foundation, August 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/research/doklam-start-very-beginning.
[8] Manoj Joshi, “The Wuhan Summit and the India-China Border Dispute,” ORF Special Report No. 62, Observer Research Foundation, June 2018.
[9] B.R. Deepak, “A Journey Through History,” Seminar No. 728, April 2020, https://www.india-seminar.com/2020/728/728_br_deepak.htm.
[10] Media Centre, “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 1, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018.
[11] Manoj Joshi, “Terror, Kashmir & Trade: Deconstructing Modi-Xi’s Chennai Summit,” The Quint, October 13, 2019, https://www.thequint.com/opinion/terror-kashmir-and-trade-deconstructing-modi-xi-chennai-summit-india-china.
[12] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “China Should Restore Status Quo Ante of April in Ladakh: Jaishankar to Wang Yi,” The Economic Times, September 11, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-should-restore-status-quo-ante-of-april-in-ladakh-jaishankar-to-wang/articleshow/78047812.cms?from=mdr.
[13] “NSA Ajit Doval Talks to China’s Wang Yi, Troops Pulled Back Along LAC: Read Full Statement Here,” Hindustan Times, July 6, 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/nsa-ajit-doval-talks-to-china-s-wang-yi-troops-pulled-back-along-lac-full-text/story-WZ2c3lnSrYs4pz9SX5u5xI.html.
[14] Media Centre “Question No 382 India China Dialogue, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 382 to be Answered on 2.2.2021,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/33453/question+no382+india+china+dialogue.
[15] Suhasini Haidar and Ananth Krishnan, “Peace in Border Areas Key to Normal Ties, India Tells China,” The Hindu, March 26, 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/peace-in-border-areas-key-to-normal-ties-india-tells-china/article65258828.ece.
[16] Haidar and Krishnan, “Peace in Border Areas Key to Normal Ties, India Tells China.”
[17] Shubajit Roy, “LAC Actions Eroded Trust, Public and Political Basis of Our Ties: NSA Ajit Doval Tells Chinese Diplomat Wang Yi,” Indian Express, July 26, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/nsa-ajit-doval-chinese-diplomat-wang-yi-meeting-lac-strategic-trust-8858864/.
[18] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32785/15th+Meeting+of+the+Working+Mechanism+for+Consultation+amp+Coordination+on+IndiaChina+Border+Affairs.
[19] Nitin A. Gokhale, “Why Kailash Range Operation was Planned and Executed,” StratNews Global, August 31, 2023, https://stratnewsglobal.com/world-news/why-kailash-range-operation-was-planned-and-executed/.
[20] Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, “China Demands Creation of Buffer Zones Inside India-Claimed Lines On Depsang Plains,” The Telegraph 0nline (Kolkata), May 22, 2023, https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/china-demands-creation-of-buffer-zone-inside-india-claimed-lines-on-depsang-plains/cid/1938629.
[21] “India, China Share ‘Perspectives’ on ‘Complete Disengagement in 21st Corps Commander talks,” The Hindu, February 21, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-share-perspectives-on-complete-disengagement-in-21st-corps-commander-talks/article67871607.ece.
[22] Media Centre, “External Affairs Minister’s meeting with Member of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Political Bureau and Foreign Minister, H.E. Mr. Wang Yi on the sidelines of ASEAN-related Foreign Affairs Meetings,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 25, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38007/External_Affairs_Ministers_meeting_with_Member_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China_CPC_Political_Bureau_and_Foreign_Minister_HE_Mr_Wang_Yi_on_the_sideline.
[23] “Wang Yi Meets with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202407/t20240725_11460514.shtml.
[24] “Wang Yi Meets with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar”.
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[29] Media Centre, “Meeting of Prime Minister with Mr Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China on the Margins of the 16th BRICS Summit,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, October 23, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?38457/Meeting+of+Prime+Minister+with+Mr+Xi+Jinping+President+of+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on+the+margins+of+the+16th+BRICS+Summit.
[30] Media Centre, Press Release, “32nd Meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 5, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38699/32nd_Meeting_of_the_Working_Mechanism_for_Consultation__Coordination_on_IndiaChina_Border_Affairs.
[31] Media Centre, Press Release, “23rd Meeting of the Special Representatives of India and China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of India, December 18, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38805/23rd_Meeting_of_the_Special_Representatives_of_India_and_China#:~:text=The%2023rd%20Meeting%20of%20the,Beijing%20on%2018%20December%202024.
[32] Zhang Yuying and Liu Calyu, “23rd Meeting of Special Representatives for China-India Boundary Question Reaches Six Points of Consensus,” Global Times, December 18, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202412/1325333.shtml.
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[36] Manoj Joshi, “Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Military Might: India’s Post Galwan Strategies in Managing China,” ORF Occasional Paper no. 508, Observer Research Foundation, November 2025, 14-15, https://www.orfonline.org/research/diplomacy-sanctions-and-military-might-india-s-post-galwan-strategies-in-managing-china.
[37] Joshi, “Diplomacy, Sanctions and Military Might: India’s Galwan Strategies in Managing China”.
[38] Joshi, “Diplomacy, Sanctions and Military Might: India’s Galwan Strategies in Managing China”.
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Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...
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